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In the wake of the global financial crisis, many emerging market countries have been the 
recipients of unstable capital flows.  Indeed, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has gone so far 
as to refer to post-crisis capital flows as a ‘tsunami’ that is a cause of great concern in the 
developing world.  Different nations have responded to this challenge with different tools.  Some 
nations have deployed capital account regulations, others have intervened in currency markets, 
and others have refrained from any activity at all.  This paper analyzes the actions of Brazil and 
Chile between 2009 and the third quarter of 2011.  During this period Brazil deployed capital 
account regulations and Chile intervened in its currency markets.  We examine the effectiveness 
of each of these actions and the extent to which the actions of Brazil caused capital flow 
spillovers in the Chilean market.  Consistent with the peer-reviewed literature on the subject, we 
find that capital account regulations had small but significant impacts on the shifting the 
composition of capital inflows toward longer-term investment, on the level and volatility of the 
exchange rate, on asset prices, and on the ability of Brazil to have independence in monetary 
policy.  Brazil’s regulations did also temporarily cause an increase in capital flows into Chile.  
Chile’s interventions did not have a lasting impact on the Chilean exchange rate or on asset 
prices beyond the initial announcements of the policies.  In Brazil’s case we thus conclude that 
Brazil’s regulations helped the nation ‘lean against the wind,’ but were not enough to tame the 
tsunami. 
 
JEL CODES: E65, F32, F36, F41 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
The regulation of cross-border capital flows was the norm during the Bretton Woods era. 
Beginning in the 1970s however, many developed countries significantly liberalized their 
capital markets and began encouraging their developing country counterparts to follow suit.  
The move to capital market liberalization has theoretical justification, but did not hold up to the 
empirical evidence, at least in the case of the liberalization of short-term capital flows in 
emerging market and developing countries.  Indeed, the role that unstable capital flows played in 
the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s questioned the merits of capital account 
liberalization in developing countries for many economists and policy-makers alike.   Leading up 
to the global financial crisis attention had thus shifted to identifying the ‘threshold’ level of 
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income and institutional development whereby capital market liberalization could become 
associated with growth and financial stability in developing countries. 
The global financial crisis has elevated this debate once again.  Many economists have 
pointed out how unstable cross-border capital flows were at the root of the crisis—with the 
United States borrowing $5 trillion from foreigners between 2001 and 2008 and one-third of the 
nation’s housing debt owed to foreigners, and two-thirds of government debt by 2008 (Chinn and 
Frieden, 2011). What is more, a landmark International Monetary Fund (IMF) position paper 
found that those emerging market and developing nations that deployed capital controls (this 
term will be used interchangeably with “capital account regulations” and “capital flow measures” 
throughout the paper) were among the least hard hit during the crisis, leading the IMF to 
proclaim that capital account regulations are a legitimate part of the macroeconomic policy 
toolkit (Ostry et al., 2010). 
In the wake of the financial crisis, low interest rates and slow growth in the industrialized 
countries has triggered mass inflows to emerging market and developing countries where interest 
rates and growth have been relatively higher.  However, when global capital markets have felt 
chilled, such as with the emergence of the Eurozone crisis, there have been sudden stops of 
capital flows to developing countries and capital flight to ‘safety’ in industrialized country 
(chiefly US) markets.  The IMF and others have expressed concern that such capital flow 
volatility is making it difficult for emerging market exchange rates, asset markets and beyond 
(IMF, 2011a). 
Numerous countries have responded to this volatility either by deploying capital controls 
or by intervening in foreign exchange markets.  In this  comparative  study  we examine  the  
financial interventions  of two EMEs—Brazil and  Chile—and  the  relative  effectiveness of 
their  respective policies.   In late  2009 Brazil imposed  a foreign exchange  transactions 
(IOF)  tax  on foreign purchases  of equities  and bonds, i.e. a tax  on capital  inflows. On 
the other hand, the Chilean central bank pursued foreign exchange market intervention 
through daily dollar purchases beginning in January 2011. Both countries  implemented  such 
measures  in response to steep  appreciation  in  their  exchange rates and heavy capital  
inflows that  resulted  in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Hence, our  time  
frame  of analysis  is the  post-crisis  period, beginning in early 2009 during  which  EMEs 
recovered  substantially well and even experienced booms in their  exchange rate  and asset 
price markets.  The analysis ends in late 2011 when there was a sudden stop in capital 


















Table A:  Summary of Measures to Manage Capital Flows in Brazil and Chile 
 
 
We investigate several macroeconomic outcomes in order to quantify the overall 
efficacy of these measures.  We test  the  impact  on  three  main  variables:   each  country’s  
equity market indices, the  level and volatility  of exchange rates,  and the  volume and 
composition of net  capital  inflows.   Our findings are summarized in Table A.  In Brazil, 
we find that the introduction of capital controls was associated with an increase in total 
inflows but that the composition was shifted from short to longer-term inflows.  We also 
find that Brazil’s measures had a lasting impact on the level and volatility of the 
exchange rate.  In terms of asset prices, only announcements of controls were effective, 
and were offset by regulations on the ADR market that send investors back to Brazil.  We 
also find that Brazil’s measures modestly increased the ability of Brazil to pursue an 
independent monetary policy.  Chile’s currency interventions were less successful.  The 
announcement of currency intervention reduced the level of the exchange rate, but not the 
volatility, and made the domestic stock market more independent from the region as a 
whole.  Chile’s interventions had no statistically significant impact on total inflows of 
Country Total 
Inflows 
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capital, the composition of inflows, or the ability of Chile to pursue an independent 
monetary policy.   
The paper is divided into six parts.  Section 2 very briefly reviews some of the literature 
on the theory and evidence pertaining to capital market liberalization and the use of capital 
account regulations in general. Section 3 presents the experience of Brazil and Chile with respect 
to capital flows in the period of study and discusses the use of data in the study as a whole. 
Section 4 outlines our modeling approach and methodology, while section 5 presents the results 
of our analysis.  A final section summarizes our conclusions and suggests further work for 
research and policy. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
The pendulum has swung back, forth, and now back again on the benefits of capital 
market liberalization.  In the wake of the Great Depression and World War II, the architects of 
the Bretton Woods system were adamant that current transactions should be freely transferable, 
but that capital account transactions should not.  Beginning in the late 1970s and 1980s that 
consensus began to change and capital market liberalization became a norm in theory and a 
policy goal in practice.  The pendulum swung yet again in the aftermath of the East Asian 
financial crisis.  Since then a large body of theory and evidence has arisen that justifies the 
regulation of cross-border finance. 
Theoretical applications in the 1970s and 1980s point out that cross-border capital 
account liberalization would reap benefits because then capital would flow to areas that had a 
higher-return investment (i.e. EME and other countries in need of capital), and make markets 
more stable by incentivizing international risk sharing and diversification.  It was further posited 
that capital market liberalization would enhance financial market development, and thus spur 
economic growth (Henry, 2007).  
The empirical evidence, however, is more mixed.  Numerous influential studies have 
concluded that (previous to the global financial crisis) that capital market liberalization was 
associated with economic growth in industrialized countries, but associated with a lack of growth 
and an increase in financial instability in developing countries (Stiglitz, et al., 2006).   Recent 
studies have shown that the benefit of growth can only arise in economies that have reached 
a certain institutional threshold (Kose, Prasad, and Taylor 2009, Prasad e t  al. 2003).  
Henry (2007) provides a survey of the theory and evidence regarding capital market 
liberalization and growth, and two main conclusions are the following: institutional 
development is a key ingredient to reaping the benefits of capital openness, and empirical 
studies can be improved by employing a policy experiment approach.  Such an approach is 
utilized in this study, by which we measure the impact of a policy before and after its onset. 
Other studies have emphasized specific costs associated with capital openness, e.g. 
exchange rate appreciation, negative externalities s uc h  as over-borrowing, increased 
vulnerability to capital flight and crises.  Hence, another subclass of this literature centers 
on the analysis of the cost of short-term capital flows—an important source of volatility, 
excessive risk-taking, and economic vulnerability.  Short-term flows can be distortions to 
the competitive equilibrium since they are influenced heavily by private investor activity, 
e .g . in the form of noise trading, speculation bubbles, etc. 
Theories examining the costs of capital market openness relate to the incidence of crises, 
sudden stops, and capital flight. A vast literature has emerged in defining the relationship 
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between capital market openness and bank and currency crises. The foundation of the recent 
literature has stemmed from the Mundell-Fleming model, an open economy framework 
addressing the effects on foreign exchange markets, monetary policy, and fiscal policy. A 
notable conclusion of this model influencing theory and policy is the so-called trilemma: perfect 
capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate regime, and independent monetary policy cannot all 
coexist; countries can maintain at most two of the three. The trilemma is one explanation for the 
eruption of currency crises in EMEs and the subsequent use of capital controls. 
Stiglitz and Ocampo (2008) outline adverse consequences of capital market 
liberalization, with a focus on developing countries. First, open capital markets can create 
negative externalities, in form of currency appreciations, depreciations, or reductions in credit 
supply. Externalities arise because individual investors due not internalize the social impact of 
their borrowing and lending behavior. Second, open capital markets allow for coordination 
failures to more readily occur, due to heightened rollover risk which can lead to capital flight. 
Third, loss of monetary discretion may happen, particularly because interest rate fluctuations can 
cause large inflows or outflows. Fourth, imperfect information among investors results in herd 
behavior that propagates panics. Fifth, currency and maturity mismatches due to incomplete 
markets are prevalent and only heighten exchange rate and interest rate risk. Finally, incomplete 
equity markets and informational asymmetries make it difficult for countries to issue new equity 
in order to raise capital, thereby resorting more to self-financing so that the gains from 
globalization are not had. All in all, the consequences of open capital markets are costly, and 
raise the need for market interventions such as capital controls, which, according to Stiglitz et al. 
(2006), are the most effective policy instruments. 
Theoretical studies have specifically modeled these costs in order to derive the optimal 
policy. In particular, Aizenman (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), and Korinek (2011) are 
studies that have modeled capital flows as sources of negative externalities, showing how they 
create a wedge between private and social marginal benefits. These models then advocate capital 
controls as the optimal policy that corrects the wedge and restores efficiency. 
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of capital flow management are usually country-
specific and target specific capital control policies. The results then range across countries and 
across types of controls. However, Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011) offer a comprehensive 
assessment of the existing literature. Their review first acknowledges the lack of a unified 
theoretical framework, no common empirical methodology, and the heterogeneity of empirical 
findings across studies. They then address these drawbacks by summarizing studies of controls 
on inflows and outflows and of multi-country studies, and critiquing their methods and results. 
The authors argue that capital controls are imposed by EMEs to combat four fears: fear of 
appreciation, fear of hot-money (short-term) flows, fear of large inflows, and fear of loss of 
monetary autonomy. Two additional fears, also addressed in our paper, are the fear of asset 
price bubbles and the fear of capital flight (Ocampo and Palma 2008; Grabel 2003; Epstein 
2003). Ostry et al. (2010) found that those nations that deployed capital controls in the run up to 
the global financial crisis were among the least hard-hit during the crisis.  Magud, Reinhart, and 
Rogoff (2011) find that controls on inflows increased monetary policy independence, altered the 
composition of capital flows, and reduced exchange rate volatility; controls did not reduce the 
volume of net flows in most studies. Nevertheless, the effects, though statistically significant, are 
temporary and small in magnitude. Finally, their review presents a theory to justify the impact on 
flow composition. Using a portfolio balance approach, their model shows how capital flow 
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restrictions can raise the share of short-term investments. This outcome will be tested in our 
study. 
 
3 Background and Data 
 
Brazil and Chile each intervened in the market to address the fears and concerns outlined 
in the last section.  Brazil deployed capital account regulations, Chile intervened in its currency 
markets.  Figure 1 depicts the rise in the Brazilian exchange rate, which appreciated over 40 
percent between 2009 and 2011 before dropping during the worst of the Eurozone crisis in 
September of 2011.  Figure 2 exhibits Brazil’s potential stock market bubble that followed a 


































In our regressions for Brazil, all data for the asset price and exchange rate regressions 
are daily frequency and are obtained from Bloomberg. For the Brazil regressions, our time 
period spans 1/5/2009 to 12/13/2011. For this time period, Figures 1 and 2, respectively, 
display the course of the Bovespa, Brazil’s national stock exchange, and of the Brazilian 
nominal exchange rate (Real) in terms of U.S. dollars.  The vertical line in each figure gives 
the date at which the IOF tax was first announced and imposed on October 19, 2009. The 
first announcement was followed by a string of tax hikes, modifications, as well as other 
types of capital flow management.  As can be seen, the first announcement proceeded a 
period of steep appreciation in both asset prices and the exchange rate. 
The dates of the announcements of controls were specified from news articles and 
previous studies. Our event dates of interest are shown in Table B below. The dates are 

























2008 2009 2010 2011











Data on capital and current account flows and GDP are monthly frequency and available 
on the Central Bank of Brazil website. Additional variables in the capital flow regressions are 
taken from Bloomberg. These regressions cover November 2008 to November 2011. We begin 
our time frame at the end of 2008 in order to avoid the structural break caused by the 2008 
financial crisis. Figure 3 below depicts this structural break in the capital flow data, in which 
substantial capital outflows resulted in the second half of 2008, but reversed their direction by 
the end of the year, resulting in positive net inflows by the start of 2009. Here, we define the 
capital account as the sum of the capital account and financial account, as given by the central 
bank data website. The financial account is composed of direct investment, portfolio investment, 
derivatives, and other investments, while the capital account is much smaller in size. Any feature 
to note is the relative volatility of FDI and non-FDI net inflows, as the latter includes more 
volatile, short-term investment and governs the overall trend in the capital account. 
After a significant domestic debate regarding which measure to use in order to stem 
exchange rate appreciation and to prevent an asset bubble, Chile chose to conduct daily dollar 
purchases. For Chile, our time period spans slightly longer, from 1/5/2009 to 3/30/2012, in order 
to include a period after which the intervention ended. Even though Chilean interventions did not 
commence until the end of 2010, we use the early start date to incorporate spillover effects of the 
IOF in our analysis. For this time period, Figures 3 and 4, respectively, display the course of the 
Santiago Stock Exchange, Chile's national stock exchange, and of the Chilean nominal exchange 
rate (Peso) in terms of U.S. dollars. The vertical lines denote the announcement and the 
termination of the Chilean currency market intervention. Again, as in Brazil, we see that the 











Chile pursued a different policy of currency market intervention. As seen in the table 
below, the Chilean Central Bank conducted daily purchases of $50 million U.S. dollars, which 
lasted almost one year. A month prior to the intervention, the central bank also raised the limit on 
foreign investment in pension funds to 80% from 60%. The last increase occurred in October 
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Figure 5. Santiago Stock Exchange 
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Table C. Currency Market Intervention in Chile, 2010-2011 
 
 
To our knowledge, three studies have investigated the impact of the Brazilian IOF tax. 
Forbes et al. (2011) examines the IOF tax in Brazil, but tests only the impact on portfolio flows, 
using the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research database. Their novel dataset gives fund-level 
investments by country, but only accounts for 5% to 20% of total country market capitalization. 
They find evidence that controls reduce investor portfolio allocations to Brazil.  They also find 
that spillovers occur due to Brazil’s actions. Levy-Yeyati and Kiguel (2009) quantify the 
effectiveness of the IOF tax on the Brazilian exchange rate by running similar regression 
analyses to our own. The study, however, tests only the impact of the announcement of the tax, 
and not subsequent changes. Finally, IMF (2011b) tests for spillover impacts of Brazil’s capital 
controls. 
As the next sections show, we build on these studies by incorporating additional policy 
and modifications to the IOF tax through the end of 2011. We also examine a broader range of 




In this study we examine the extent to which the interventions by Brazil and Chile had an 
independent impact on exchange rate levels and volatility, asset appreciation, as well as the 
scale, composition, and spillover impacts of capital inflows.  The model specification for each is 




We assess the impact of the capital controls on changes in the Brazilian and Chilean 
nominal exchange rates by running a GARCH (1,1) regression. GARCH (1,1), or General 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity model with 1 lag in the error term and 1 lag in the 
variance term, allows us to not only study the impact on the level of the exchange rate, but also 
its volatility. Before running this regression, we must first test for heteroskedasticity, or ARCH 
effects, using Engle’s Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test. Here we fit the model by OLS to test the 
null hypothesis of no ARCH effects. The LM test gives p-values well below 0.05; hence, we can 
reject the null of no heteroskedasticity. 
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The model testing the impact on the level and volatility of exchange rates is given below. 
The first equation gives the level regression, while the second gives the variance regression. For 





Our variables of interest here are the dummy for the day of the first announcement, the 
dummy for the entire period for which the controls were in place, and the interaction variable—
the dummy for the entire period times the change in the domestic interest rate. The coefficients 
on the dummies are the abnormal returns after controlling for the other covariates. Description 
and calculation of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are given in the next 
section. The interaction term measures the extent to which controls improved monetary 
autonomy: controls are successful in improving autonomy if changes in the domestic interest rate 
have smaller or negative effects on the exchange rate. The covariates are the regression are the 
change in the foreign interest rate (LIBOR) as well as log changes in the dollar exchange index 




In order to assess the effectiveness of the controls on curbing asset price appreciation, we 
conduct an event study on the Brazilian national stock exchange (Bovespa) and the Chilean 
national stock exchange (Santiago). Controlling for changes in the regional stock market, proxied 
by the MSCI EM Latin America index, we compute the marginal and cumulative abnormal 
returns of capital control announcements. Abnormal returns capture whether the controls caused 
a significant reaction in the stock market, controlling for changes in the overall market. Hence 
they effectively measure the difference between the actual and expected return of the local stock 
market. We obtain cumulative abnormal returns by aggregating the marginal abnormal returns of 
each announcement, which are given by the coefficients of the event dummy variables.
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Cumulative returns provide a better measure for the overall effect of the tax.  
Similar to an event study, we run regression of the log change in the Bovespa on 
dummies for the announcement of the IOF tax and for subsequent policy modifications and on a 
dummy for the period during which the equity tax was in place. The model regression, along 
with the definition of abnormal returns, is shown below. 
                                                            
2 In other words, cumulative abnormal returns, where n is the final period, are computed 







Announcement dummies are specified for the day after the announcement if announced 
after trading hours. Along with the dummy variables, we include an interaction variable—the 
regional market index times the overall control dummy—to capture the effect on local equity 
market independence.  
 
Scale, Composition, and Spillover Effects of Capital Flows 
 
Analysis of the impact on the capital account is four-fold. First, we conduct a cross-
sectional regression of the Brazilian net capital inflows on capital control event dummies, 
interest rate differentials, and other covariates. Second, we study the impact on the composition 
of capital flows by studying the following capital flow outcomes: FDI less non-FDI flows and 
short-term versus long-term flows. Third, we run a panel regression of several Latin American 
economies in order to better explain the deviation of Brazilian net inflows from the regional 
trend in response to capital controls. Finally, we test for spillover effects by studying the impact 
on Chilean flows in response to the Brazilian capital controls. Here, we run a cross-sectional 
regression of Chilean flows. All flows are given as a percentage of GDP. 
The model of the panel regressions is given by the general equation below. We use a two-
month dummy for the announcement of the introduction of the IOF tax in order to obtain a better 
measure of the effect as well as more reliable standard errors. We use a multi-month dummy 
specified for all announcements (to measure a cumulative effect of all announcements) and 
another multi-month dummy specified for the entire period the tax is in place (to measure the 
overall effect of the IOF implementation period). We also include time (month-specific) effects 
to capture the overall trend of flows as well as any unobservable effects altering the level of 
flows. Additional country-specific covariates include the current account, as a percentage of 
country GDP, interbank domestic-US interest rate differential. 
 
 
The cross-sectional regressions are similar and include more covariates. However, a 
substantial drawback is the low number of observations as well as the presence of endogeneity of 
the regressors. We address endogeneity by running IV regressions, using the lagged dependent 
variable as the instrument. We again use two-month dummies for each announcement in order to 
obtain valid standard errors, as well as dummy for the entire period when they are in place and a 
dummy for all announcements. Covariates are a lagged dependent variable, the current account, 
VIX Volatility index, EMBI Global Spread, a Bloomberg carry trade index, the FX premium, 
and interbank interest rates. The carry trade index measures the US short rate and the Brazilian 
long interest rate differential; thus, a positive coefficient is expected since a higher index should 






We conduct analyses for total flows and disaggregated flows by decomposing net capital 
inflows into short-term and long-term measures. The short-term, long-term decomposition is 
similar to the FDI, non-FDI decomposition; non-FDI is composed largely of short-term 
investment while FDI can be regarded as long-term investments. We improve the FDI, non-FDI 
measure by stripping out long-term investment from portfolio investment and other investments. 
Long-term investment is thus measured by the sum of these long-term investments and FDI. 
Short-term investment is defined as short-term portfolio plus other investment (trade credits, 
currency and deposits, loans) plus derivatives. 
 
5.  Results and Analysis 
 
Consistent with the literature reviewed above, we find that Brazil’s capital account 
regulations had a significant but small impact on exchange rate levels and volatility, asset 
appreciation, on monetary policy independence, and on the scale, composition, and spillover 
effects of capital flows.  In each of the other cases the impacts of the controls were temporary 
‘speed bumps’ that allowed Brazil to lean against the wind but were far from enough to change 
the course of the monetary ‘tsunami’ that afflicted Brazil during the period.  Chile’s 




In Table 1 both the mean and variance regressions of the Brazilian exchange rate are 
displayed. The first 8 variables listed are dummies of the day of each regulation announcement. 
The ninth variable, ‘Controls Dummy’ is a dummy for the entire period for which the controls 
were in place. As given by the coefficients of the daily announcement dummies, in the mean 
regression all announcements of controls have significant returns, with the largest return of -1.9 
percent coming from the first announcement of the IOF. The cumulative returns of the 
announcements, however, amount to only -0.3 percent. The control dummy for the entire period 
is also significant and negative, yet at a very small magnitude of -0.1 percent. The control 
dummy also has a significant effect on exchange rate volatility, with a coefficient of -0.77: a 
negative coefficient implies that the controls decreased exchange rate volatility. All covariates—
interest rate differential, DXY, GSCI, and EMBI—are significant in both regressions. The signs 
of the coefficients make economic sense as well: an increase in the foreign interest rate, dollar 
exchange index, and EMBI spread yields a lower nominal exchange rate, while an increase in the 
commodity price index appreciates the exchange rate. Given the structure of the regression 
equation, all coefficients in this regression are an approximate measure of the impact on the log 
variance of the exchange rate. Finally, we find evidence of increased monetary autonomy, given 
by the negative coefficient on the domestic interest rate interaction variable.  
According to Table 2 currency market intervention also had significant effects on the 
Chilean peso. We also find evidence of spillover effects from the IOF. The first five variables 
listed are dummies for the day each policy was announced. The sixth variable, ‘Intervention 
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Period Dummy’, is the dummy for the entire period of the intervention. As captured by the 
intervention announcement dummies, the announcement first had a positive impact of 0.4% on 
the peso level, but then a negative and larger impact the following two days of -4.4% and -1.5%. 
The announcement of foreign investment limits also had a fairly large effect of 1.4%. Overall 
though, the intervention period did not have significant effects on either the level or volatility, as 
indicated by the intervention period dummy. Since the coefficient on the interaction variable is 
not significant, we find no evidence of improved monetary autonomy. The IOF announcement 
had a positive and significant impact on the peso level, and a negative and significant impact on 





The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. In Table 3 of Brazil stock prices, the first nine 
variables listed apply to dummies of each announcement day, while the tenth variable, ‘Controls 
Dummy’ is a dummy for the entire period of equity tax. According to Table 3, the first 
announcement of the IOF tax induced a statistically significant, but small drop of -0.3 percent in 
the Bovespa. All subsequent tax hikes yielded significant (except the second increase), positive 
and small returns of less than one percent. The modification announcement, which extended the 
tax to bonds with maturities up to 720 days, from 360 days, had a significant and negative effect 
of almost -1 percent. The announcement of a 60 percent reserve requirement of US dollar 
positions for banks also had a significant and negative, but smaller effect of -0.4 percent. 
Surprisingly, cumulative abnormal returns, computed by aggregating the coefficients of all 
announcements, of the policy announcements amounted to almost -1 percent if we exclude the 
ADR announcement and equity removal announcement. Brazil noted that some investors were 
circumventing the 2 percent IOF tax by going through the ADR market and thus put in place an 
ADR tax, implemented about a month after the original IOF tax. As could be expected, the ADR 
coefficient is positive—taxes on ADRs closed the window on ADR purchases and thus re-
triggered flows to Brazil. The coefficient is also approximately -1 percent and somewhat 
neutralizes the cumulative impact of the IOF measures. In summary, the IOF had a lasting 
impact on Brazilian asset prices as well, but one that was perhaps reversed given the tax on the 
ADR market. 
The control dummy for the entire control period did not yield a significant return, as well 
as the return from the interaction variable, which measures stock market independence. Hence, 
we do not have evidence that changes in the Bovespa became more independent of the regional 
markets with the implementation of the controls. We can also not conclude that the controls 
cooled a supposed asset price bubble, as the control dummy can measure. The abnormal returns 
for days following each announcement are also not significant.  
In Table 4, we run a similar analysis for the Chilean Santiago Stock Exchange. Not only 
do we test the effects of Chilean currency intervention, but also the presence of spillover effects 
from the Brazilian IOF tax. The first four variables are dummies for announcement days, while 
the fifth variable is the dummy for the entire period of intervention. The spillover effect can be 
quantified by the IOF Announcement dummy, which, according to the table below, is significant 
and positive. However, the magnitude of the effect is small and under 0.6 percent. The 
announcement of Chilean intervention had no significant effects. Interestingly, the 
announcement of the end of the daily dollar purchases had a significant and fairly large effect on 
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stock prices, over 1 percent. The announcement of increases in foreign investment limits also 
was significant, with a magnitude of almost -1 percent. In contrast to Brazilian stock regression, 
we find evidence of increased stock market independence, given by the coefficient of the 
interaction term of 0.29. Hence, during the period of intervention the Santiago exchange and the 
regional stock index were less correlated, but only by 0.01 percent. Nonetheless, we find no 
evidence that the period of intervention had any effect of domestic stock prices. The 
announcements of both foreign investment limits and the Brazilian IOF, however, did have 
significant effects. We conclude that our analysis gives evidence of spillover effects as well as 
significant but small effects of intervention on asset prices and stock market independence.  
 
Scale, Composition, and Spillover Effects of Capital Flows 
 
 The impact of the IOF on the scale and composition of inflows is also fairly consistent 
with the literature. As in the other cases above we find small but temporary effects of capital 
account regulations. Tables 5 and 6 show the effects on composition of net capital inflows. Table 
5 provides a more discerning decomposition of net inflows, and more interesting results. In this 
table, while the announcements are not significant in the OLS regressions, the first IOF 
announcement as well as the announcement of the reserve requirement becomes significant in 
the IV regressions. Surprisingly, the effect of these announcements is positive on short-term 
flows and negative on long-term flows—precisely the opposite intended effect of policymakers. 
However, according to the dummy on all announcements, the effect on short-term flows is 
negative, yet under 0.01%. 
Contrastingly, Table 6 of total flows and flows decomposed into FDI and non-FDI flows 
do not yield significant effects from the first IOF announcement. The all-announcement dummy 
is positive and significant in the OLS regressions of total and FDI flows, yet loses its 
significance with the instrument. Yet, not only are most of the variables insignificant, but also 
very small in magnitude. 
To complement the cross-sectional analysis, we create a panel of three Latin American 
countries in order to obtain a better measure of the effect of the IOF on Brazilian flows in 
relation to neighboring EMEs. The other countries are Chile and Colombia. Preferably, we 
would like to include a wider dataset; however, other Latin American EMEs have substantially 
less developed markets and also do not have monthly data for capital flows or GDP. Here, we do 
not include all other announcement dummies as they were not significant. In the panel 
regression, the covariates except the forward exchange rates are significant. The IOF 
announcement has positive and significant effects on total and non-FDI inflows of 0.014% and 
0.033%, respectively. The all-announcement dummy, however, yields a positive, significant 
effect on FDI of 0.013%. Again, the findings are somewhat puzzling. However, both in Brazil 
and in the larger literature there is increasing concern that in the face of capital controls that 
investors ‘disguise’ short-term capital flows through financial FDI (Spiegel, 2012).  The signs on 
these coefficients lend some credence to such claims, but cannot confirm them. The results are 
depicted in Table 7. 
Table 8 gives the potential spillover effects of Brazil's controls on Chilean inflows. Here 
we run a cross-sectional regression of the Chilean capital account. Since the results did not report 





7.  Conclusion 
 
In our paper we have examined the effects of attempts to navigate volatile capital in 
Brazil and Chile.  We find statistically significant impact of Brazilian controls.  However, we 
would characterize our findings as evidence of temporary ‘speed bumps’ that helped Brazil lean 
against the wind rather than reversing ‘tsunami’ of capital inflows that afflicted the country 
during this period.  
In Brazil, we find that the introduction of capital controls was associated with an 
increase in total inflows but that the composition was shifted from short to longer -term 
inflows.  We also find that Brazil’s measures had a lasting impact on the level and 
volatility of the exchange rate.  In terms of asset prices, only announcements of controls 
were effective, and were offset by regulations on the ADR market that send investors 
back to Brazil.  We also find that Brazil’s measures modestly increased the ability of 
Brazil to pursue an independent monetary policy.  Chile’s currency interventions were 
less successful.  The announcement of currency intervention reduced the level of the 
exchange rate, but not the volatility, and made the domestic stock market more 
independent from the region as a whole.  Chile’s interventions had no statistically 
significant impact on total inflows of capital, the composition of inflows, or the ability of 
Chile to pursue an independent monetary policy.   
More specifically, effects on the Brazilian exchange rate are similar: all announcements 
have a statistically significant impact, with the first IOF announcement have the largest negative 
effect, though small in magnitude. The overall effect of the controls is significant, but small. In 
regards to asset prices, we find that the announcements of the IOF and subsequent policy 
changes have statistically significant effects on the Bovespa. Particularly, the cumulative impact 
of all announcements is negative, yet small. However, the overall effect on the period during 
which the controls are in place is not significant.  
In Brazil, controls did have significant impact on total inflows as well as the composition 
of flows, yet the effects are fairly small. The impact of announcements and overall impact are 
significant, but again small.  
For Chile we find that Brazil’s cross-border financial regulations seemed to 
increase capital inflows to Chile for a short-period, but not a lasting one.  Moreover, 
Chile’s reserve accumulation measures had only temporary effects in Chile and did not 
withstand the markets over time. 
Our findings are consistent with the research on capital account regulations as reported 
by Magud et al. (2011) and Ostry et al. (2010).  From a policy perspective we can further 
confirm that these measures can impact exchange rate appreciation and the development of asset 
bubbles.  However, it is not clear from our analysis that such measures should be conduct alone 
but should rather be part of a wider package of macro-prudential policies.  From our analysis, 
capital controls alone will not be sufficient to address the concerns about capital flow volatility 
unless they are much stronger and better enforced.  Indeed, our finding that the controls were 
associated with a shift toward FDI may lend credence to claims that capital account regulations 
encourage some investors to circumvent regulation by disguising short-term capital flows as 
FDI.  Finally, our parallel analysis of Chile finds that intervening in currency markets can have 
an even weaker effect than capital flow management measures and be costly in terms of their 
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